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Why the choice of fund manager carries so much weight

In private equity, the results of fund managers are much further apart than on the stock market. The fund manager you choose therefore determines a large part of your return.

Denzell Melles
Denzell MellesManaging Partner
·Reading time 5 min

If you invest in a listed equity fund, you usually notice little difference between a good fund and an average one. Many funds partly own the same large companies and largely move with the market. Private equity is different. A fund manager buys a limited number of companies, negotiates the price itself, works on improvements for years and chooses the moment of sale. As a result, results vary widely between fund managers.

How big is the difference?

A common way of measuring this is to rank all fund managers in a category in order, from best to worst performing, and divide that ranking into 4 equal parts. The top quartile is the group with the highest returns, the bottom quartile the group with the lowest. The difference between the threshold of the top quartile and the threshold of the bottom quartile shows how far apart the results are.

J.P. Morgan Asset Management set out that difference over the past 10 years. For global equity funds, the top quartile achieved more than 12.7% per year and the bottom quartile less than 9.1%: a difference of 3.6 percentage points. For private equity, those thresholds were 20.4% and 1.1%: a difference of 19.3 percentage points, more than 5 times as large.

Annual returnDifferencein percentage points0%5%10%15%20%25%Bond funds0.1%2.0%1.9Listed equity funds9.1%12.7%3.6Private equity1.1%20.4%19.3The top quartile achieved more than thisThe bottom quartile achieved less than this
Return per year over 10 years, global. Bond and equity funds: Q2 2016 to Q2 2026. Private equity: IRR up to and including Q1 2026. Source: J.P. Morgan Asset Management.

And these are only the thresholds of the 2 groups. The best and worst funds themselves are further apart.

The same picture in every vintage year

This is not a chance outcome of a single period. When buyout funds are compared by vintage year, the top and bottom quartiles are also consistently far apart. For funds that started investing between 2002 and 2022, the difference in return per year was never smaller than 9.0 percentage points (vintage year 2018) and rose to as much as 21.1 percentage points (vintage year 2003).

VintageAnnual returnDifferencein percentage points0%5%10%15%20%25%30%200217.3200321.1200417.2200510.720069.420079.5200811.6200912.6201013.4201111.6201214.8201313.4201414.620159.3201611.7201711.220189.0201913.12020*12.82021*12.52022*12.7The top quartile achieved more than thisThe bottom quartile achieved less than this* Young funds: returns are still provisional.
Global buyout funds, return per year (IRR) by vintage year, as at Q1 2026. Source: J.P. Morgan Asset Management, based on Burgiss.

A difference of 10 percentage points per year may sound abstract. As a highly simplified illustration: if €100,000 grows by 10% per year for 5 years, it is worth over €161,000. At 20% per year, it is worth over €248,800.

For the youngest funds, the figures are still provisional. As described in our article on the J-curve, value creation takes time and the final result is only fixed once all the companies have been sold.

Good past results are no guarantee

It is natural to choose a fund manager that did well last time. That is a logical start, but it is not enough. A fund manager raises new money while the previous fund is still running. At that point, the return of that fund is largely an interim result, and interim results change. Research by Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan and Stucke on US buyout funds shows that of the funds that were in the top quartile during fundraising, 54% also ended up there.

A good figure is therefore a start, not an answer. When you assess a fund manager, you also look at what lies behind it: how the return was achieved, whether the team is still the same, whether the approach is repeatable and whether the team invests its own money alongside investors. That requires thorough research and access to information that is not public.

What does this mean for investors?

Given these large differences between fund managers, 2 things help. The first is selection. A careful analysis of team, approach and results increases the chance of a good choice, but is never a guarantee.

The second is diversification across several fund managers. If you invest in one fund, you are entirely dependent on one team. If that team disappoints, it affects your whole investment. If you spread your commitment across several funds, you limit the impact of one disappointment. That is the idea behind a fund of funds: a fund that itself invests in a number of carefully selected private equity funds.

One fundabout 10 companiesthrough 1 fundOne setback hits everything.Fund of fundsabout 100 companiesthrough about 10 fundsOne setback hits a small part.
Illustrative example.

Diversification also comes at a price. A fund of funds charges its own fee on top of the costs of the underlying funds. And diversification dampens the impact of one positive outlier in the same way as that of one disappointment. The risk of a disappointing result decreases, but does not disappear.

The choice makes the difference

In private equity, the difference between a good and a less good fund manager is large, much larger than on the stock market. The question of who you invest with in private equity is therefore at least as important as the question of whether you do so at all.

Sources

  1. J.P. Morgan Asset Management (2026), Guide to Alternatives 3Q 2026, p. 9 (Public and private manager dispersion) and p. 48 (Global private equity return dispersion by vintage year), data as of 31 July 2026. am.jpmorgan.com
  2. Harris, R.S., Jenkinson, T., Kaplan, S.N. and Stucke, R. (2023), Has persistence persisted in private equity? Evidence from buyout and venture capital funds, Journal of Corporate Finance 81, 102361. doi.org
  3. Open-access version of the same article (Oxford University Research Archive). ora.ox.ac.uk

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  1. The target net return (net IRR and net multiple) is an objective of Two Rivers Capital, not a forecast or a guarantee. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. The actual return depends on the underlying funds and companies and may be lower or negative. The net multiple is total distributions divided by total contributions, after all costs.
  2. Not tax advice. A Two Rivers Clusterfund is a cooperative (coöperatie) and aims to invest only in funds to which the participation exemption applies. In principle, the Clusterfund then owes no corporate income tax on the proceeds from those funds. If you invest through a Dutch entity that pays corporate income tax, such as a BV, NV or cooperative, your interest in the Clusterfund in principle falls under the participation exemption, regardless of its size. If you invest privately or through a foreign company, different tax treatment applies. For foreign funds, whether the participation exemption applies is assessed case by case. The manager may deviate from the policy of investing only in such funds. Have your situation reviewed by your own tax adviser.
  3. Purchase price as a multiple of EBITDA. Lower mid-market: companies with €1 to €8 million EBITDA, around 5.0 to 7.5x. Large companies: €100 to €250 million EBITDA, around 11.0 to 16.0x. Sources: Oaklins (January 2022), FS Investments, Pitchbook, Preqin, Bain & Company. Indicative: the actual price differs by company, sector and timing.
  4. Median net IRR of European buyout funds, vintages up to and including 2016: funds up to €250 million 20.0% (245 funds), funds of €5 billion or more 13.1% (64 funds). Source: Preqin, September 2026. After fees of the underlying fund, before fees of Two Rivers. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.
  5. Share of the total size of European buyout funds, vintages 2015 to 2026 (Preqin, September 2026). Lower mid-market: micro and small-cap buyout. For comparison: companies with fewer than 250 employees generate 51% of value added in the EU (Eurostat, 2023).
  6. Median net debt as a multiple of EBITDA at purchase, Europe: enterprise value up to €200 million 2.8x, €500 million or more 6.2x (Qualitas Insight, European transactions).
  7. Net return per year of European buyout funds (Cambridge Associates European Buy-out Index, around 1,700 funds) compared with the MSCI Europe using the same timing of contributions and distributions (PME), over 5, 10 and 20 years, in euros. Source: Bain & Company, Global Private Equity Report 2025 (data up to and including the third quarter of 2024). Before fees of Two Rivers. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.
  8. Chance that a portfolio returns less than was paid in (TVPI below 1.0x). Historical simulation based on 3,077 funds from 1991 to 2005, equally weighted (Cambridge Associates). Before fees of Two Rivers. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.
  9. Through MaasInvest and Schouten Investments.
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